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ISSUES !N CENIRAL BANK

Dole et ol {201 I ) noted thoi,
over the post two decodes,
centrol bonks' opprooch to

WLllAletS D. KAREEL4

I.O

INTRODUCTION

Centrol bonk communicotion
con be defined os the provision
of informotion by the centrol
bonk to the public regording
such motters os the objectives

of

mo

netory policy, the

monetory policy strotegy, the
economic outlook, ond the
ou tloo k for future policy
decisions (Blinder et ol, 2OO8).
ln the post communicotion wos

not token serious by centrol
bonks just becouse of their
conservotive noture os they ore
hordly seen or heord in the
public. Centrol bonkers took

pride in mystif ying

communicolion os observed by
Woodford (2004), when he
observed thot before I990s.
centrol bonking wos shrouded
in mystery, ot the Federol
Reserve ond e ls ew h ere.

According to

h

im. the

"mystique" of centrol bonking,
by
centrol bonkers os essentiol to

wos guorded jeolously

their success. Blinder et ol {2008)

olso ogreed lhot centrol bonks
used to be shrouded in mystery,
ond believed they should be. A

few decodes

ogo,

conventionol wisdom in centrol

bonking circle held thot

monetory policy mokers should
soy os little os possible, ond soy it
crypticolly.

communicotions hos
undergone o seo chonge. The
cultivotion of secrecy ond
mystique hos been reploced by
o zeol for openness ond
tronsporency. Although, the
benefits of on open ond
tronsporent monetory policy
process ore now widely
recognized ond understood
mony centrol bonks ore slill
groppling with the exoct ond
best woy to ochieve thot oim.

20I4

COMMUNICATION

ln the some vein, Comonescu
(2012) opined thot during the
lost two decodes, centrol bonk

communicotion ond
tronsporency become
u

ndispulo

ble conditions

of

eff ective monetory policy.
Centrol bonks seek to creote o
climote of conf idence by
communicoting strotegicolly on

their policy gools, rules ond
operotions, with the finonciol

An opprooch of "more

morkets ond lhe generol public.
Tomuleoso (2013) olso ogreed
thot cenlrol bonks were reolly
reserved, but were constroined
to communicote much more

correct. There ore costs os well
os benefits ossocioted with

finonciol crisis.

informotion is olwoys better"
thon is neither sufficieni nor

communicoting everincreosing omounls of noisy ond
complex informotion. As centrol
bonks seek to continue their

progress toword gre oter

openness, these c osts ond
benefits, ond their implicotions
for lhe design of centrol bonk's
communicotion need to be
better undersiood.

Also olluding to lhe foregoing.
Syrichos (2004) noted thot. in
the post, the communicotion
proctices of centrol bon ks

could best be described

os

secretive ond ombiguous, thus,
giving rise to o certoin mystique
surrounding their octivities. ln
controst, communicotion todoy
is considered to be on essentiol
ond vitol port of modern cenlrol
bonk policy moking. Over lhe
post fifteen yeors or so, centrol
bonks hove ploced more ond
more emphosis on the omounl
of informotion they releose 1o

obout monetory policy issues,
especiolly becouse of the
pressu res from the recent
Furlhermore, CLAMS (2004)
noted thot there con be no
doubt thoi informotion is o
voluoble resource leoding to
knowledge. Knowledge is
power. lnformotion is obtoined
vio communicotion ond in its

widesl meoning of
disseminoting ond tronsmission
of knowledge. Theref ore,
communicotion implies o high
degree of responsibility on those
who provide it, o commitment
thot tronslotes into truthfulness,
tro ns po re ncy ond ethicol
integrity.

It is therefore

timeliness ond quolity. This new

pertinent to
postulote thot in recent times,
centrol bonks hove recognized
these ottributes os voluoble
ossets, since they provide them
with credibility ond prestige.
Thus, o mo.iority of centrol bonks
hove convinced themselves of
the need for communicotion.
Communicotlon in its widest
sense, not only with the so

dif f erent
strotegies.

groups within society thot
demond informotion on the

the public os well os on

its

open opprooch hos been
welcomed by the public ond
hos improved the efficiency of
monetory policy
54

colled medio

- newspopers,
ro d io, television, n ews
ogencies, etc, but olso with oll
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centrol bonk ond its oclivities.
Almosl oll monetory outho.ities
in the world todoy recognize

the imperotive need for
ond tronsporency.
Mony prestigious cenlrol
bo n kers olreody consider
openness

communicotion os on inlegrol
port of their responsibilities, on
the some levelos monetory ond
exchonge role policy or reserve
monogement.

2.0 WHY DO CENTRAT BANKS
COMTAUNICATE?

One moy orgue thot openness
is the reoson why centrol bonks
communicote. Although there
ore two moin rotionoles for
openness, the effectiveness of
monelory policy could be
stressed more. with o more
lronsporent centrol bonk,

morket expectotions ore so
criticol to the tronsmission of

monetory policy - e.g. through
the lermed slructure of inlerest
rotes. the reoctions of stock
morkets ond exchonge rotes.
ond woge ond price setting will
ref lect on policy chonges
moking it bgtter ond fosier. One
moy exomine o number of the
modem ocodemic orguments
for 'creolive ombiguily', ond
find them wonting. lf the centrol
bonk is both open ond honest,

then, the orguments for
obfuscolion melt owoy.

A philosophicolly

differenl

orgument for openness derives
from the need for democroiic
occountobilily. As o public
institution o pero tin g on
delegoted outhority, o centrol
bonk must be fully occounloble
to the elected representolives

of the people.

Thus,

tronsporency con be thought of

os on implied corollory of
centrol bonk's independence:
in exchonge for its brood gront
of outhority. The cenhol bonk
owes the public tronsporency

ond occountobility.
Communicotion
of both.

is

ol the heorl

APRIL

lhol ony
cenlrol bonk ought to convey

The essentiol messoge

to lhe public is its policy regime:
whot it is trying to ochieve, how
it goes oboul doing so, ond its

proboble reoctions

to

the

contingencies thot ore likely to
occur. Of course, no centrol
bonk con spell out in odvonce

its reoction to every
conceivoble contingency; nor
is it necessory to reveol every
detoil of its operotions. The
guiding principles should be
two.

the bonk should reveol
enough obout ils onolyses,
First,

octions ond internol
deliberolions so thot interested
observers con undenlond eoch

monelory policy decision

os

port of o logicol choin of

decisions leoding to some
objective(s). Centrol bonks
need to communicote with ol

leost four constituencies whose

needs moy be somewhol
different - the morkets. the
medio, lhe politicions ond the

brood public. But the messoges
communicoled lo eoch must
be consistent. This is o

-

DECEMBER
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sense of oulonomy ond
independence required io
ochieve their obiectives. From
this perspective, the moin
responsibility of o centrol bonk's
communicotion policy consists
in ensuring thot its vision of the
world is commonly understood,
ond in tronsmitting informotion

in o longuoge thol

is

understood ond shored by the
public.
Despite the foct thot o centrol
bonk is essentiolly o iechnicol
ond operoiionol entity, its field
of oction hos on undeniobly
politicol dimension to the extent
thot. it wields on exclusive stote
prerogotive in the creotion of
money by odminishotive fiot,
ond becouse ils octions hove o
direci impocl on the welfore of
the community. This is why
centrol bonks must exploin lheir
conduci, ond the molives
underlying their octions to the
society. This view wos further
strengthened by Tomouleoso
(2013) who opined tho t
orguments in fovour of o strong

communicotion includes
increosing monetory policy

on

insurmounloble obstocle.

efficiency, the predictobility of
cenlrol bonks octions ond the
centrol bonks' independence.

Second, the orguments for

ln the view of Erhmonn et ol

chollenge. but not

tronsporency ore so strong thot
the burden of proof should be
on those who would withhold
informotion. There ore volid
reosons for o cenhol bonk to be
secretive. e.g. lhe protection of
proprietory informolion. But thot
is not the norm, ond this reporl
proceeds with the presumption
of openness. And this must be to
the extent thol, o higher level of
common undersionding on the
port of lheir diverse oudiences is
reoched. Cenlrol bonks by this
sholl ottoin greoter levels of
credibility ond tronsporency.
This, essentiolly, will contribute
significontly lo the growing
support for centrol bonk os on
institution, porticulorly, in the
55

(2m5) communicotion ploys o
centrol role in monelory policy
moking. Centrol bonks hove
direct control only over o single
interesl rote, usuo lly the
overnight rote, while their
success in ochieving their
mondote: whelher the focus is
on price stobility or on
economic octivity requires thot
they ore oble to influence osset
prices ond interest rotes ot oll
moturities. Ef f ective
communicotion os much os
credible policy octions ore of
fundomenlol imporlonce for
ochieving these objectives.
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Conscious of the diverse noture
of its oudiences. centrol bonk
develops its own longuoge ond
construct in different levels of
discourse the some messoge it
con eff ectively tronsmit i.e.

centrol bonk will be
communicoting (ottempting o
higher degree of common
understonding) rother thon
merely informing. The modern

context of outonomous centrol
bonking is more suitoble for

meosuring the tosk ond
responsibility
of
communicotion. The lin ks
between outonomy,
tronsporency
ond
o

ccou nto

bility hove been

widely noted
porodigm

wit

hin the

of centrol bonk's

independence.

The importonce

of

communicotion strotegies for
policy ef f ectiveness follows
from o fundomentol feoture of
the kind of problem thot o
centrol bonk is colled upon to
solve. Centrol bonking is not like
steering on oil tonker, or even
guiding o spocecroft. which

ollows o trojectory thot
depends on constontly
f

chonging foctors, but does not
depend on the vehicle's own
expeclotions obout where il is
heoding. As o consequence,
there is o good reoson for o
centrol bonk to commit itself to
o systemotic opprooch to
policy thot not only provides on
explicit fromework for decision
moking within the bonk. but olso

used

to

exploin the bonk's

decision to the publlc.

3.0 WHAT DO CENIRAT

BANKS

or the exchonge role. The job

is

more c fficult for centrol bonks
with multiple gools, such os the
Federol Reserve ond the Bonk of
Jopon, but they must hove
some notion of whot they ore
trying to occomplish, ond they
should orticulote it os best they

co

n. For instonce, the

mondotes of the Centrol Bonk
of Nigerio (CBN) ore cleorly
spelt out in the Centrol Bonk of
Nigerio Act, 2007.

3.2 Toctlcs
Generolly, centrol bonks ore
quite tronsporent obout how

they go obout putting

o

monetory policy decision into
effect - os they should be.
However. there s one mo:n
exceptlon to this rule. When
th ey intervene in f oreign

exchonge .norkets, the

outhorities olmost ond olwoys
try to cotch morket porticiponts
by surprise. Also, they often
mointoin o steely silence over
how, ond when sterilized
interventions hove token ploce,
even well ofter the foct. Despite
expectotions on the subject of
openness, o deporture from the
premise of tronsporency could

be 'endorsed,' becouse
ore unlikely to
hove enough o mmunition

governments

{foreign exchonge reserves) to
force the morket to bend to its
will. So the element of surprise
ond some creotive ombiguity
obout when ond where the
outhorities ore likely to strike
next, moy be essentiol to the
success of sterilized foreign
exchonge operotions.

COMMUNICATE?

3.3

3.1 ObJectlves

ond perhops foremost,
centrol bonks need to moke

Often, il is token for gronted thot
oll decisions should be publicly
onnounced os soon os they ore
mode, with no informotionol

should be o relotively simple
tosk for o bonk with o single
torgel, such os the inflotion rote

question is: who1, if onything,
centrol bonks should soy obout

First,

cleor their long-run objectives.
This

Tolklng oboul declsions

odvontoge to selected
'insiders.' A for more difficult
56
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iheir tentotive future plons. The
old onswer to this question wos

nothing. ln recenl times,
however, more ond more
ce ntrol bonks ore moking
re lotively stroig htf orword

(though often highly stylized)
stotements obout which woy
they ore'leoning.'
Furthermore, it is possible to
distinguish omong ot leost four
brood closses of issues. obout
which o centrol bonk moy
consider reveoling more or less
to the public. The first is the
centrol bonks interpretotion of
economic conditions, including
(perhops) the cenirol bonk's
view of the outlook for the
[ulure. lo lhe extent thot this is
shoped by foctors other thon
the bonk's intentions with regord
to policy. Centrol bonks
typicolly hove o lorge stoff

to collectlng, ond
onolyzing informotion obout
currenl co nd itio ns of the
economy os on input to policy
deliberotions; ond occurocy of
devoted

privote sector understonding of
the stote of the economy might
be improved if the cenkol bonk

were

to

reveol more obout

whotit believes

it hos

leorned.

topic is the content
of the policy decisions thot ore
mode in the centrol bonk obout
current operoting torgets. A

The second

third possible kind of

communicotion would be o
description (which might be
more or less explicit) of the
strotegy thot guides the centrol

bo n k's policy decisions in
generol, while the fourth type of

communicotion mokes

stotements obout the outlook
for future policy, in the light of

current situotion, without

necessorily osserling thot, this
illustroies o generol rule thot
must olwoys be followed.

With regords to whot to
communicote, Blinder et ol
(2008) submitted thot the
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centrol bonks communicote
obout ot leost four different

ospects of monetory policy:
their overoll objectives ond
sfrotegy, the molives behind o
porticulor policy decision, the
economic outlook, ond future

monetory policy decisions.
Centrol bonks' objeciives ond
strotegies tend to be more
stoble, so the conesponding

signols show less voriobility over

time thon signols obout the
otherthree items.

4.0

HOW SHOUTD

CENTRAI.

BANKCOM'IAUNICATE?

The precise woys in which o

centrol bonk chooses to

communicote will depend on
mony foctors. But perhops the
most importont is whelher
monetory policy decisions ore
mode by o single individuol or.
os is increosingly the norm, by o
committee. And. if it wos by o
committee, it is whether the
decisions were presented os
ochieved by consensus (which
we coll o collegiol committee),
or by individuols voting for their
own preferences (which we coll
on individuolistic committee).
The distinction is cleorest when

discussing

how to

communicote the results of
monetory policy committee

promptly issued.

On the oiher hond, o

truly
individuolistic committee moy

find it quite difficult to ogree

upon o stotement in short order.
So, for instonce. the Bonk of
Englond's MPC normolly issues
no stotement ot the close of
eoch meeting.

To thot extent. tronsporency
colls for detoiled minutes to be
releosed os soon os possible.
With individuol responsibility, the
minutes might or might noi

oltoch nomes lo specific

orguments ond positions, but it
should certoinly record the vote
of eoch committee member, or
ol leost, the number of votes
cost for eoch proposol.

4.1 Asymmehlc lnformollon
The presence of on informotion

osym m etry between lhe
centrol bonk ond the public is
the bosis of the cose for full

tronsporency. Yel, lhis

orgument con be turned on its
heod. And this is becouse. the
public con never be sure thot it
fully knows the policy regime. it
needs lo scrutinize every signol
thot the centrol bonk emits. To
suspicious observers, signols ore

olwoys o mbiguous. Once

(MPC) meetings.

doubt exists, ihe onus is: how
con it be fully removed? This

Whot seems to hove become

usuolly pervodes every centrol
bonk's pronouncement, no

onnouncement of eoch policy
decision with o brief stotement,
issued shortly ofter the meeting.
ond followed some weeks loter
by o fuller explonotion in the
published minutes. There ore,
however, some obvious bui
rorely discussed trode-offs.

motter how hord the centrol
bonk tries to be tronsporent. lts

stondord proctice is the

signols stond to be
misinterpreted or exoggeroted.
The public moy reod too much

in the informotion releosed by
the centrol bonk, ond get

confused. This is true
exem

p lif

ied by

ncio l/eco no

os

Nigerion

mic

A single decision-moker hos no
meeting, no minutes ond no
vote to report. The stotement
therefore conies lhe burden of

whose divergent views ore
projected in the print ond
electronic medio whenever

behind the decision. lt should
therefore be full, intelligible ond

there ore burning issues reloting
to the CBN's policies, or
stotements.

exploining the reosoning

20I4

f

in o

57

experts

Two moin implicotions follow:
The more tro nsporent the
centrol bonk, the more signols it
sends. ond under this view, the
more volotile ore the finonciol
morkets. The centrol bonk moy
become hostoge to morket
sentiment becouse, every one
of its utteronces or octions
produces strong reoctions with
potentiolly powerful effects on

inflotionory expectotions.

The

result could be o very

conservotive opprooch to
policy with smoll, possibly

deloyed octions. The view lhot
less informotion could help to

deol with the

inf

ormoiion

osymmetry os the public does
not know os much obout the
centrol bonk preferences, ond
intentions os the centrol bonk
itself is surely porodoxicol. These
results referred to obove rely on

some peculior f eotures of
finonciol morkets which result in

such phenomeno os herding
behoviour or ponics.
Also, these phenomeno involve

o lorge number of imperfectly
informed porticlponts who drow
wrong inferences from eoch
other's behoviour or 'cheop
tolk'. There is no doubt thot

these things exist, ond
occosionolly result in serious

disruptions, even crises, os
documented byShiller (2000).

Centrol bonks sensibly feor

becoming hostoge to morket
sentiment. This is becouse, their
business is inherently uncerloin.
they need to stond reody to

reoct to numerous
contingencies ond connot be
tied down by eorlier

pronouncements, or by morket
expectotions. One solution is to

shun pronouncements

oltogether. While this moy
olleviote the hostoge-tomorkets problem, it runs ogoinst

the groin of the cose

for
tronsporency: the costs in terms
of effecliveness not to mention
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occountobility which ore likely
to o lorge extent outweigh the
benefits. A better solution is to
consider corefully the chonnels
of effect from short-term interest
rotes to stock ond bond prices
ond see whot con be done. For
stock morkets. one orgument is
thot communicoting intentions
on the future poth of interest
rotes could go o long woy
toword stobilizing expectotions.
The feor is thot such detoiled
informotion obout intentions,
which remoin highly tentotive

ond will typicolly chonge

os

new informotion flows in, could
bockfire becouse of morkei's
tendency to go to the extremes.

Hence, noting thot centrql

bonks do not reolly hove ony
informotion odvontoge over
morkets, one could be ognostic

on the desirobility of

the cose thot. in most instonces
openn;.ss wlll eliminote costly
misu nd ersto n dings. (Blinder et
ol,200l ).

4,2 Iro nsporen cy ond
lndependence

Hoving noted thol, centrol
bonks without independence
moy be subject 10 on imposed
inflotion bios, whot then is the
effect of the independence
stotus on the communicotion
strotegy? lt is pertinenl to note

thot, independence

requires

occounlobility
ond
occountobility requires

tronsporency. Here we ore
f ocusing on the economic
efficiency ospect of the
relotionship, osking whether lhe
precise form of independence
motters f or tronsporency.

communicoting such intentions.
bond morkets, centrol bonks
hold the key to current ond
future interest rotes. This gives
them the obility to strongly
For

luence the morkets, ond
therefore need not be overly
concerned to go ogoinst them.
inf

The root couse of oll this, is thot,

individ uo I

finonciol morket
porticiponts f oil to ogree
omong themselves whe n
interpreting the centrol bonk

signols. lt stonds 10 reoson thol o

complete public disclosure of
the bonk's intentions should
help coolesce heterogeneous
opinions ond drive finonciol
morkets towords the 'correct'
view (Torkko ond Moyes, I 999,
Winkler 2000). ln controst, if
morkel porticiponts ore
inherently suspicious, thot,
centrol bonkers do not olwoys
speok their m in ds, more
lnformotion will not olwoys
deliver o better understonding.
The only sensible solution is for
centrol bonks to be fully
opened. The risk is thot, trust will
never be complete ond on
occosions, more informotion
moy not be better. But it remoins

Centrol bonks which ore goolindependent ond hove o brood
mondote moy well hove, ot
leost from time to time. o
different view of whot oughl to
be done thon the public ot
lorge. lf thot is the cose, 'fhe
centrol bonk will wont to
protect some privocy, while the

public will osk for totol
tronsporency. Fo ust ond
Svensson (2000o) observed
thot, this moy exploin ihe Fed's

opprooch to limited
tronsporency. lf this ospect is
deemed im porlo n l, it is
believed th ot the proper
response is not opoqueness, but
o shif t to instrument
independence with f ull
tronsporency.
4.2.1 The olm ofllonsporency

The guiding principle is thot,
tronsporency should ollow the
public to understond, ond
possibly onticlpole the centrol
bonk's decisions ond to see
eoch of them os the logicol
conclusion of o choin of post
ond future decisions oimed of o
cleorer set of torgets, possibly,
EO

but not necessorily one torget.

ln order of importonce,

tronsporency should oim ot
providing outsiders with the
f

ollowing

inf

ormotion:

Objective(s): The centrol bonk
must fully reveol whot it is trying

lo ochieve. Observers
understond thot, setting ony
objeclive is inherently
conflictuol ond politico l.
Outslders

will olwoys

poss

judgment on the centrol bonk's
oction, so, opocity ot best buys
time. but ot o cost. There is no
shortcut to full revelotion of
policy regime. Even though, the

policy objective(s) chonge
olong with circu mstonces

(economic ond politicol), or os
new knowledge is ocquired,
centrol bonk's octions ore
guided by o limited number of
fundomentol principles, such os
keeping inflotion below some
threshold, ovoiding lorge output
gops, smoothening lnterest ond
exchonge rote chonges ond
contoining osset price volotility,
omong others. The centrol bonk
moy not set precise numbers or
weights on these objectives, but

it must develop its own
understonding of wh ere

worning signols stort ringing,

ond how to deol with conflicting
oims. lt connot, ond should not,
be more precise vis-d-vis the
outsiders, thon it is internolly, but
it should not be less precise
either. Tronsporency is oboul
shoring certitudes os well os
doubts, ond promptly reveoling
shifts in the priorities when they
occur.

Methods: Eoch centrol bonk
relies on o lorge set of meihods
of o n o lyses. This includes
selecting doto ond deciding on
how to interpret them. lt olso
involves using models, lorge
ond smoll, to produce forecosts
ond policy simulotions. Outside
observers, ond in porticulor,
professionol economists peruse

similor

doto ond use slmilor
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models os they ottempt to deol
with the some issues. There is no
reoson lo believe thot the
centrol bonk's methods ore
syslemotlcolly superior or inf erior
to those of outsiders, but lhey
moy often leod to different
conclusions. Only time con tell
who wos right ond who wos
wrong, ond there is no shome in
being occosionolly wrong. But
the bonk's oclions will not be
intelligible unless the methods
ond the conclusions of the
onolyses ore disclosed.

Full disclosure does not only
o llow for prof essionol
exchonges, it ls o precondilion
for outsiders to understond the
centrol bo nk's oclions by
reloting them to the stoted
policy regime. Reveoling the
policy regime without disclosing
the internol methods is like

providing

o cor

without ihe

engine, it goes nowhere.

Decision-moking: Outsiders
understond thot policy moking
is more of on ort, thon o science.
Some even coll it o gomble. At

times, severol reosonoble

options moy co-exist ond the
losk of the policy moker is to
choose one. Monetory policy
committee meetings ore,
therefore, likely to be
occosionolly contentious, ond
the decision finolly reoched will
reflect internol debotes. The
debotes themselves, ond who
soid whot, ond when, belongs
more to the gossip column thon
io the finonciol poges.

On the other hond,

which
orgument corried the doy ond
how convincing it wos within the
decision-moking committee,
motters o greot deol for outside
observers. lt helps them relole
the bonk's methods to the
declored objective(s), thot is,
the policy regime, ond it reveols
the degree of u ncertointy
surrounding the cunent ond
expected situotion.
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Finely bolonced decisions best
illuminote the woy priorities ore

set. The decision-mo

king

process is o reolity check on the
principles set forth. Reveoling
this process is the only woy o

centrol bonk con moke its
policy understondoble ond
predictoble.
4.3 Democrollc

A

occounloblltty

centrol bonk is

o

public

institution, ond os such, it must
be fully occountoble for oll its

octions ond procedures.

This

brood, ond uncontroversiol

principle, estoblishes the bosic
presumption thot oll informotion
ought to be releosed, unless o
good cose con be mode to the
controry. Such o cose con be,
ond usuolly is mode regording
proprietory inf ormotion on
finonciol institutions thot centrol
bonks roulinely collect, or
receive in periods of finonciol
instobility. More generolly,
morket-se nsiiive inf ormotion

requires porticulor core to
ensure o level ploying field
omong competing finonciol
inslitutions. With these
exceplions in mind, there should

not be other generic
informotion thot centrol bonks
ought to conceol from the
public domoin.
4.4 Clllzens ond lhe

medlo

ln the developing countries like
Nigerio, it is foir to note thot most

citizens core little for monetory
policy. The overoge citizen
typicolly does not understond
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They routinely core obout
interest rotes, but would not
seriously feel o difference of 50
bosis points. Meonwhile, in smoll

open economies, lhey

ore
keenly owore of the exchonge
rote. In the end, they typicolly
see centrol bonks os offecting

growth ond employment,
which moy exploin why most
centrol bonks try to distonce

themselves,

mostly

unsuccessfully, from the reol
economy. However, in recent

limes. the CBN hos been
involved in the reol sector
development with interventions
ogriculture,
power ond oviotion sectors.

in the oreos of

To thot effect. centrol bonks
need to use oll ovoiloble
communicotion chonnels. They
often publish pedogogicol
brochures, for instonce. But the
moin effort is cleorly in the

direction of the medio, ond in
porticulor, ihose thot oppeol to
ihe educoted public. Centrol

bonkers routinely moke

themselves ovoiloble for press
conferences, interviews ond
bockground briefings. They
usuolly ond freely provide doto
ond onolyses. All cenhol bonks
now hove websites with o rich,

often neorly exhoustive
content.

A porticulor chollenge is thot
some medio speciolized in
finonciol offoirs, which ore
mostly reod by the educoted
public, while most citizens
receive their informotion from

monetory policy. ond they

non-speciolized medio.
Communicotion with the
spec io lized medio comes

moke little effort to grosp whot

noturolly, ond

they perceive os on orcone
world, which speoks mostly
u n in 1e llig ib le word s. The
overoge citizen seems not to
core obout price stobility,
however, ond would reoct
strongly to o return of high

inflotion.

59

is

often more thon

odequote.
Communicotion with the nonmed io, ond
therefore, with the mojority of
citizens, is considerobly more
difficull.

speciolized
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ln deoling with monetory policy

the medio foce two problems.
First, they need to creote ond
mointoin inleresl in o technicol
subiect. Simplificotion, ond

pedogogy, is essentiol

ingredienls here but the risk is to
lose nuonce. o key ingredient in
centrol bonk communicotion.
This especiolly is the cose with
television, the most influentiol of
oll medio, where o few minutes,
often seconds, ore devoted to
ony piece of news, leoding to

the seorch for 'sound

bites.'

Cenlrol bonkers noturolly feor
this form of communicotion,
which con eosily leod to
misquototion.
Secondly, lhe centrol bonk

is

monopolist

out

in dishing

o

monetory policy, but it should
not enjoy monopoly in
discussions of monelory offoirs.
The medio need lo diversify their
sources of informotion ond
onolysis. Much is the some
concerning government, but
there, the medio con olwoys
turn to opposition politicions.
Becouse the medio will olwoys
seek conlrorion views, centrol
bonks need well-inf ormed
critics who con chollenge lheir
words ond their deeds. ln some
countries, there exisl selfoppointed shodow monetory
policy commitlees. ln generol,
centrol bonks would be wellinspired to feed with os much
informolion os possible o wide
group of experts, if only to ovoid

debotes borne out of
ignoronce of whot they do, ond
thin k.

4.5

Governmenl3 ond
podlomenl3

Governments, ond the

porliqments represent the
citizens, but they moy olso hove

their own ogendo, precisely
becouse of lhe limited interest
of citizens in monelory offoirs.
Governments ore keenly
interested in monetory policy

becouse of shored
responsibilities {e. g. the

exchonge rote) ond shored
impocl on bolh inflotion, ond
economic octivity. Most cruciol
is the economic conditions
which often ploy o decisive role
in elections, so governments
ond their opposilions must hove
o cleor view of whot they would
like the centrol bonk to do over

the proceeding period.
Conflicts of interests ore the
norm, ond this is why
independence is cruciol.
Independence, now the norm
roiher thon the exception,
slightly complicotes motters. On
the one hond, independence
conies responsibility for centrol
bonk's unelecled officiols. Wilh

responsibility comes
occountobilily to elected
off iciols. Centrol bonk
occountobility is generolly
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only engoge in 'diologue' with

centrol bonk officiols, bul
connot offect its stotules ond
ob.iectives.

ln

Nigerio, the Centrol Bonk

usuolly hove periodic ropport

with the Notionol Assembly's
Committees on Finonce.
Bonking, lnsuronce ond Other
Finonciol lnstitutions, Public
Accounts, Notionol Plonning,
Public Accounts, Commerce,
Petroleum,

elc.

(Pleose note

thot the Notionol Assembly

comprises the Senote ond the
House of Representotives). The
Notionol Assembly hos in lurn
exercised its conlrol over the
CBN on mony occosions by
summoning the Governor to
oppeor before if, ond moke

clorificotions on monetory
policies ond other burning
issues.

estoblished in ils stotutes. ln most

coses, the centrol bonk is
formolly occounloble to the
porlioment, but on the other
hond, independence requires
on orms-length relotionship
between cenlrol bonks ond

Whotever

is

the institutionol set

up, tronsporency greotly
enhonces centro I bonk's
in de pende nce vis-o-vis
pollticions, while furthering the

gool of occountobility. The

politicions. Some centrol bonks

more open the bonk is, the

ore both gool ond instrument

con it be omenoble 1o

independenl, ond forbidden by
low to toke instruclions from ony

government politicol pressure.

Greoter tronsporency

outsider. In thot cose,
occountobility must bolonce

independence

ond

democrotic control.

Porlioments ore usuolly the
custodions of centrol bonk
behoviour, implying formol
reporting. ln some countries
(e.9. the United Stotes ond the
United Kingdom) porliomentory
oversight is bocked by the righl
to omend the stotutes ond/or
the procedures of the centrol

bonk. This gives weight to
porliomentory control ond
provides on effective tool of
communicotion between the
centrol bonk ond the elected
representotives. ln others, the
Euro oreo being o good
exomple, the porlioment con
50

less

o lso

to lessening the
impoct of institutionol
shortcomings, be it excessive or
insuf f icient power of
porlioments. (Blinder et ol.
contributes

200r ).

5.0

PRINCIPI.ES FOR SOUND

CENIRAI.

BANK

COMTAUNICATION

The CLAMS (2004) noted thot.
the design ond implementotion
of best proctices in centrol
bonk's communicotion rest

upon five fundomentol pillors.
These moy be considered os the
bosic principles thoi should be
observed in order thol the
communicotion process be
efficient ond effective. ond fulfill
its objectives. These bosic
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the degree thot. o collective

principles ore the following:

octions lo oll sociol groups.

l.

4. A centrol bonk should
consolidote the process of

The point of deporture of
centrol bonk's communicotion
strotegy must be to occept the
premise thot, the better the

public understonding

of
moneiory policy, the more
effeclive itwill be.

2.

lt

is

imperotive thot centrol

bonks pursue

o

prooctive

communicotion policy. This
prooctive element must come
obout os o true bolonce
between the troditionol spirit of
the centrol bonker ond its role
os o dynomic, open ond
tronsporent communicotor.
This prooctive policy must be
dynomic, demonding ond
oimed ot o wide ond diversified

sociol spectrum with welldefined interlocutors. ll should
be oll embrocing in its efforis to
reoch oll groups within society.
The messoges should be
tollored to eoch intedocutor
group.

3. A centrol bonk
design ond
integ

ro

should
implement on

I ond

o

rtic u lo ted

communicotion strotegy so os
to odequotely tronsmit, ond
exploin its objectives ond

disseminoting omple ond
tronsporent informotion os o

systemotic process ond
conlinuous effort oimed ot

guiding ond exp lo in in g
monelory policy. ll is nol
sufficient for economic ogenls

to hove timely occess 10
informotlon; lhey must olso
hove the elements wilh which

to interpret it properly.
thus, will the messoges o

Only

cer'lrol

to trons,. ic
get
iety
soc
through, ond
ochieve on outhentic
consensus on its everydoy
bonk wishes

business.

Since in mony countries,
espec io lly the e m erging
economies, inflotion is one of

5.

the

phe

nomeno leost

understood by the public,

despile the foct thot. they hove
been directly offected by the
rise in prices for o long period of
time. the communicotion ond
disseminotion effort must begin
by building on outhentic ontiinflotionory sociol consensus. ln

other words, the work

must

begin ot the foundotion, ond to
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sociol consciousness regording

the domoge coused by
inf lotionory pressures con
gother ground; more
f ovou ro ble expectotions
oligned with the disinflotion

gools of the centrol bonk to be
strengthened.

6.0

CONCTUDING REMARKS

on ottempt
discuss some issues

This orticle is

to
in
communicolion ond show thot
it is o very importont ospect of
centrol bonking. Although, the
volue of communicotion hos
been hitherto ignored, il hos
become evldent over time thot,
for o centrol bonk lo succeed in
ochieving its set objectives ond
mondotes, it must put in ploce
effective ond ef f icient
mechonisms needed in
crofting, ond disseminoting
informotion obout its policies.
The obility of the centrol bonks

to

identify their stokeholders
od dress their unique

ond

communicotion needs will
enoble lhem to eorn the trust of
their stokeholders ond portroy
them os tro nspore n t ond
occounloble entities.
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